U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need to Return to Basics
By: Don Sutherland
Across the board, U.S. foreign policy is achieving highly consistent outcomes—consistently bad ones. Those outcomes are either damaging critical U.S. interests or making it more difficult for the United States to safeguard or promote such interests. In Iraq, the government is tilting increasingly to Iran while American armed forces are constant attack in struggle of attrition, Iran is defiantly pushing ahead with its nuclear ambitions, North Korea is threatening to test a nuclear device, the Taliban is making a comeback in Afghanistan, and Somalia has fallen into the hands of radical Islamists who have Al Qaeda ties. These unsatisfactory outcomes are the direct result of a triumph of increasingly abstract theory over practice.
Among the lessons that are clear is that Neoconservatism, like the earlier idealist approaches that preceded it, has failed. Instead of being anchored in history, it set its ideological foundation in the mirage of Panglossian optimism. Instead of recognizing the importance of allies in a world constrained by a balance of powers, Neoconservatives chose a solo approach under the seductive illusion of a new “Unilateral Moment” that was supposed to have rendered the need for allies obsolete. In short, Neoconservatism became increasingly detached both from history and reality. Consequently, under the stewardship of a largely Neoconservative foreign policy team, U.S. foreign policy has crashed and is now burning in many parts of the world where U.S. interests are greatest.
It is time to return back to basics in foreign policy and diplomacy. Diplomacy is pursued to resolve conflicts in interest to arrive settlements that secure or advance the core interests of all the parties involved. Good solutions, rather than perfect ones, are the objective. In diplomacy, compromise and conciliation are utilized to find or develop sufficient common ground so that the parties’ objectives are mutually-advanced, core needs are protected and, overall, the situation is at least somewhat better than it would otherwise be.
Occasionally, the conflicting interests are irreconcilable—sometimes by fact, other times by rigidity among the parties themselves—and warfare results. However, barring extraordinary circumstances, war is typically viewed as a resort to be pursued only after an exhaustive effort at diplomacy has failed and one’s core needs are endangered.
Overall, flexibility is a hallmark of pragmatism on which successful diplomacy rests. Such flexibility is constrained by the core needs (as opposed to desires) of the parties and those core needs form the proverbial “red lines” which cannot be crossed in any negotiated settlement.
Pragmatic Realism—Realpolitik with a dose of idealism—is largely pragmatic in nature and it rests on calculations of national interest and power. It incorporates a degree of idealism e.g., having a stable or free world as its end. Such an approach is grounded in an understanding of human nature as illustrated through the historical experience and an underlying assumption that human nature changes very little over time (ongoing human evolution might eventually change this, but such change would lie in the very distant future). The lessons that have been learned–and relearned–time and again are essentially that strength provides leverage, weakness invites aggression, and appeasement magnifies threats to one’s critical or vital interests.
Unlike under Neoconservative idealism, which also seeks a free world, the use of military force under Pragmatic Realism is more restrained. The issue of preemptive military action is a good case in point. Under Pragmatic Realism, preemptive military action may be taken when there is “unequivocal warning” of an imminent threat to one’s critical or vital interests. When Intelligence is ambiguous or one’s critical or vital interests are not at imminent risk, Pragmatic Realism rejects preemptive military action.
In contrast, under Neoconservatism, the use of force is seen as an instrument for shaping a new world. Hence, preemptive military action is viewed by Neoconservatives as legitimate for purposes of “regime change” toward that end. Neoconservatism differs only from Wilsonian idealism in that it sees military force as the major arbiter of change while Wilsonian idealism views international institutions as the arbiters of change. Based on all the information that has arisen in the wake of the Iraq war, the Iraq war would likely fit the Neoconservative view of preemptive conflict.
When a nation is a great power, Pragmatic Realism suggests that the power be viewed as a precious resource to be used wisely. Hence, Pragmatic Realism places importance on enduring relationships along the lines of common interests. Neoconservative idealism, because it grants greater license to a use of force, seeks expedient relationships e.g., temporary ad hoc coalitions, to allow it to move ahead. The more liberal license for a use of force given by Neoconservative idealism can lead to a number of adverse consequences: a balancing of power by other states against the great power that liberally uses force if such states view that the force is not used for legitimate purposes, increases risks to their own interests, etc. As such, Neoconservatism can give rise to global instability while Pragmatic Realism can promote stability.
Although idealism can work well in setting objectives, it falls short when it comes to accomplishing those ends. Compromise and conciliation are essential prerequisites to diplomacy. Diplomatic bargaining requires a degree of flexibility (again constrained by the “red lines”). Diplomatic bargaining is not appeasement. The two should not be confused. Diplomatic bargaining creates “win-win” situations where all parties obtain benefits and core needs are not compromised. Appeasement is an inequitable approach where one party wins and the other loses. One makes major concessions or takes unilateral steps while receiving nothing in return with the hope that such an exchange would resolve a given threat. Usually such exchanges only act as a catalyst for a gathering threat, as they provide strong signals of weakness and a lack of resolve.
In contrast to pragmatic approaches, wholly idealistic postures give rise to a proliferation of irreconcilable positions. Such an approach increases the risk of conflict. The uncompromising nature of idealistic positions precludes diplomacy, because diplomacy entails flexibility that is at odds with the idealistic posture of the parties in a dispute. Consequently, a use of force becomes the only means left for resolving such a dispute and conflict erupts if any of the parties are sufficiently determined to pursue their idealistic objectives.
In the end, a more pragmatic approach tends to inform decision-making in business (negotiated contracts) and governance (with respect to foreign and domestic policy). The reality that resources are limited—limits of economic, military, political, and ideological power—promotes pragmatism. Hence, what one refers to as “focus” in a business setting takes precedence. Therefore, with the exception of critical or vital interests, most issues are viewed as amenable to compromise by managers and political leaders. An uncompromising approach on most or all issues is seen by most as unsustainable. As a result, attempts to pursue such a strategy can only lead to a weakened ability to safeguard one’s critical or vital interests.
With current U.S. foreign policy in bad shape and continuing to disintegrate, the “Neoconservative Moment” has passed. It is time for U.S. foreign policy to return to the Pragmatic Realism that served it so well throughout the Cold War Era. Only then will the U.S. be able to safeguard and promote its critical international interests. Only then will it have a meaningful chance to overcome the serious challenges to its national security.
Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.